
By Andrew Zarnett
This is a follow-up to Prediction Markets After the Blue Wave.
A quieter front. The fight over prediction markets is usually told as a courtroom story. States say sports contracts are really gambling. The federal regulator, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), says they are federally regulated financial contracts that states cannot police. Appeals courts are split. This year a quieter front opened: states started taxing. North Carolina, Illinois and Kentucky have each passed a tax that applies to prediction market platforms.
How the money works. A sportsbook makes money by setting odds so the two sides of a game add up to more than 100 percent. After it pays winners, what it keeps is its revenue, and states tax that revenue. A prediction market works more like a stock exchange. Buyers and sellers trade contracts that pay $1 if an event happens, and the platform charges a fee on each trade. In principle, a bettor's loss goes to another trader, not to the platform, so a tax falls on its fees. That tax does not reach the profits of professional trading firms, called market makers, such as Susquehanna, which supply much of the trading.
What each business keeps. What each business keeps per dollar matters for tax. DraftKings, which now runs its own exchange, reported that its sportsbook kept 6.4 percent of the money wagered as net revenue, after promotions, in the third quarter. On its exchange it reported an 11.1 percent take rate in September and October, meaning every participant's exchange fees, broker fees and market-making profits added up to 11.1 percent of what customers paid for contracts. DraftKings kept 7.3 percent of that volume, and outside market makers kept the rest. Only part of that is fees, and fees are what exchange taxes reach. At North Carolina's rates, a sportsbook pays about $1.47 of tax on every $100 wagered. An exchange would pay at most about 44 cents on every $100 traded, if all of DraftKings' 7.3 percent were taxable fees. That is my illustration, since money wagered and contracts traded are not identical measures.
A thin edge. Prediction markets' edge is less about price than about operating under different rules. The price-tracking firm Tater Labs found that betting both sides of an NFL game cost 3.94 cents per dollar of payout on Kalshi, fees included. That compares with 4.36 cents at the typical sportsbook, a saving of only about four-tenths of a cent. Sportsbooks also pay state taxes on their revenue, at rates from 23 percent in North Carolina to 51 percent in New York. Fortune reports that the exchanges' federal regulation lets them avoid state taxes. That likely helps explain how they can charge less.
Three playbooks. States have written three kinds of tax. North Carolina taxes and tolerates. Starting January 1, 2027, it will take 6 percent of exchanges' fee income from North Carolina customers, while its budget recognizes the CFTC's authority and lets registered exchanges operate without a state license. Illinois taxes and regulates. It folded the exchanges into its sports betting law, which requires a state license, and taxes each trade at 1.75 percent of its value, rising to 3.5 percent after a platform's first 5 million trades each fiscal year. Kalshi and the CFTC have both sued. Kentucky taxes to shut them out. Its 14.25 percent tax on exchanges' fees, passed in April and starting January 1, 2027, compares with 9.75 percent on horse track wagers, and the CFTC says it makes operating in the state impossible. The advantage for states is that a tax raises money without waiting for a court to decide whether exchanges must follow state gambling law.
Squeeze, not collapse. A 14.25 percent tax like Kentucky's would add about half a cent to Kalshi's roughly 3.5-cent fee for betting both sides of an even-odds game. If passed on to customers, that is more than the 0.4-cent price edge. But a price edge is not the same as profit. Kalshi is private, so the best public estimates come from PitchBook, as reported by InGame. For 2026, PitchBook forecasts that Kalshi will earn $1.2 billion in adjusted EBITDA on $3.7 billion of gross revenue, a margin near 32 percent. If a 14.25 percent tax on fees applied to all of that revenue, Kalshi's margin would fall to about 18 percent, cutting its profit by about 45 percent but leaving it profitable. The real danger to exchanges like Kalshi is a tax on the money traded instead of the fees, which is what Illinois's tax does. With Kalshi's fees near 1.2 percent of volume, even a 2 percent tax on volume would exceed what it earns on each dollar. Sportsbooks absorb tax rates of 23 to 51 percent of revenue because they keep about five times what Kalshi earns in fees per dollar wagered.
A legal wrinkle. Taxing a business can imply it is legal. By taxing the exchanges as exchanges, a state concedes they run a lawful business, which could weaken an argument that their sports contracts are illegal, unlicensed betting. Kentucky is doing both: it sued Kalshi, Polymarket and three platforms that carry Kalshi's contracts (Robinhood, Webull and Coinbase) in June while taxing their fees. An industry group that includes Kalshi has sued in state court, calling the tax discriminatory and in conflict with federal law.
Who wins. If states raise exchange taxes toward sportsbook rates, Kalshi and Polymarket lose a cost advantage that DraftKings and FanDuel never had. Both already pay sportsbook rates on their betting and now run their own exchanges, DraftKings Predictions and FanDuel Predicts, so higher exchange taxes would hit them on only part of their business.
What to watch. Three things will say more than any forecast: (1) whether other states copy North Carolina's, Illinois's or Kentucky's approach, (2) whether the courts uphold these taxes, including Illinois's tax on money traded instead of fees and the industry's lawsuit against Kentucky's tax, and (3) whether the CFTC's proposed rule classifying event contracts as financial contracts called swaps gives federal regulators a stronger case against state taxes.
Final arbiter. The biggest question still is whether the Supreme Court takes up the circuit split.
Andrew Zarnett is a Senior Advisor at SCCG Management, with 30 years of experience in the gaming sector as an investment banker and research analyst. Read his full bio.
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