Asia’s Casino Glut: What the Data Tells Operators About Supply, Demand, and Recalibration

The question of whether Asia faces a casino glut has moved from theory to observable strain. Properties from Incheon to Brisbane show signs of distress. Philippine gaming revenue fell 16% in the first quarter. In Macau, five of six concessionaires reported revenue and EBITDA below 2019 levels despite gross gaming revenue tripling that of Las Vegas last year. Japan saw only one qualified bidder for its three integrated resort licenses in 2022.

Steelman Partners CEO Paul Steelman states there is definitely a glut of casinos throughout Asia because gaming is now available to much of the population across the region. The old mantra of build it and they will come no longer holds uniformly. For gaming operators and executives, this inflection point demands a clear-eyed assessment of supply pipelines, ROI realities, and shifting customer segments.

A Glut by Any Name

The conversation around oversupply is not new. In May 2019, a Union Gaming report co-authored by John DeCree projected an Asia gaming glut with projects exceeding US$65 billion scheduled to debut by 2025. The report, now under CBRE after its acquisition of Union Gaming, warned that regional EBITDA would need to reach US$27.7 billion to justify proposed properties outside Japan, more than double the 2018 figure.

DeCree notes he is not sure if a supply glut is the right word but there are markets and projects struggling to ramp with high-ROI opportunities harder to come by. The pandemic later helped alleviate some supply risk by delaying openings. Yet the core concern about too much supply in too short a window remains relevant.

Half-Finished Projects and Tiny ROI

Post-2019 investment reached an estimated US$21 billion in Asian land-based gaming. Regional EBITDA moved from US$13.6 billion in 2018 to US$13.7 billion in 2025. That produced a 0.7% EBITDA increase and roughly 0.5% ROI on the capital deployed.

DeCree says numerous projects ramping below expectations validates the 2019 concern. Nicola Greenaway of Nikau Design Group adds that Asia’s gaming market is still expanding but in key hubs capacity is mismatched with demand. The decline of VIP play and migration to digital channels have left segments of the land-based sector underutilized. The industry is recalibrating and pockets of oversupply are becoming more visible.

Vitaly Umansky of Seaport Research Partners offers a counter view. He does not think there is a glut but points to mismanaged and overbuilt assets in certain areas. Korea’s foreigner-only casinos likely have too many. The Philippines market is probably getting oversupplied especially when Westside City opens. Singapore by contrast appears undersupplied.

Product-Market Mismatch and the Vanishing VIP Segment

A consistent theme emerges around customer focus. Niall Murray of Murray International Group says struggles across Asia Pacific stem not from gluts in most cases but from investments that continue to target junket and VIP customers who no longer exist. He urges operators to give current and emerging customers what they want rather than what Western-centric thinking believes they want.

Andy Choy, a longtime gaming executive, states there is definitely a glut of casinos designed and built for high-end gamblers from mainland China. The real problem is a product-market mismatch as almost every property chases the same small segment using luxury amenities and commission payments. That high-end segment was once large enough to dominate strategy but today genuine innovation and a shift away from the luxury market are required.

Choy’s back-of-the-envelope calculation highlights an underserved mid-market. Combining annual visitors to Macau and Singapore yields roughly 60 million per year, about 1.5 times Las Vegas visitors. The core feeder market in China is roughly five times the size of Las Vegas’s feeder market suggesting demand could be underrepresented by a factor of more than two.

In Macau, large-scale overnight mass business remains significantly underperforming. Premiumisation has converted mass-market rooms into fewer high-roller suites. VIP GGR fell from US$16.8 billion in 2019 to US$8.4 billion last year. Concessionaires also carry a collective US$13.6 billion non-gaming investment obligation from the 2022 agreements.

Risk, Execution, and the Need for Discipline

Not every distressed property traces to broad oversupply. Specific factors hit Inspire in Incheon, Hoiana in Vietnam, and Queen’s Wharf Brisbane. These billion-dollar-plus projects originated in the early 2010s when demand seemed limitless and operators feared missing Macau’s expansion.

Steelman, whose firm designed the US$1.6 billion Inspire, notes that large integrated resorts need daily energy from both tourists and locals. Relying almost entirely on foreign tourists is extremely difficult. Mohegan Gaming lost control of Inspire to lender Bain Capital in February 2025 after default on its US$275 million loan. Bain has since made management changes including hiring Steve Wolstenholme as chief casino officer.

Hoiana, originally backed by Suncity, opened its US$1.3 billion first phase in June 2020 amid Covid. After the arrest of Suncity chairman Alvin Chau it required a new model. Chow Tai Fook Enterprises later increased its stake.

At Queen’s Wharf Brisbane, cost grew to A$3.5 billion (US$2.5 billion) under Asian investors expecting high-end tourism that never fully materialized. Umansky observes the customer base no longer comes to Australia to gamble. Tight regulation following money-laundering revelations has further constrained operations. Star Entertainment exited its stake in March with Chow Tai Fook and Far East Consortium now partnering. The property still needs a strategic shift toward local play but execution lags.

Greenaway sees a mismatch between scale, timing, and proven demand across many projects. Optimistic assumptions around VIP gaming, tourism recovery, and regional spillover did not fully materialize. This cycle is enforcing discipline. Future developments are likely to be more measured, flexible, and grounded in real demand.

The Bottom Line

The data shows Asia’s land-based casino sector is not uniformly oversupplied but carries clear pockets of mismatch between built capacity and current demand. VIP contraction, digital migration, and execution shortfalls have produced disappointing ROI on substantial capital. Operators that recalibrate toward underserved mid-market segments, local participation where permitted, and genuine product innovation stand to navigate this structural shift more effectively than those clinging to outdated high-roller models. For client-partners assessing Asian exposure the signal is clear: discipline in capital allocation and customer strategy will separate sustainable performance from continued distress. What matters next is who adapts fastest to the recalibration already underway.